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CoopEval: Benchmarking Cooperation-Sustaining Mechanisms and LLM Agents in Social Dilemmas

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学术前沿 7.0 分 — Finding that stronger LLMs cooperate LESS in social dilemmas is striking and important for multi-agent system design
原文: cs.CL updates on arXiv.org

评分 7 · 来源:cs.CL updates on arXiv.org · 发布于 2026-04-17

评分依据:Finding that stronger LLMs cooperate LESS in social dilemmas is striking and important for multi-agent system design

arXiv:2604.15267v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave less cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner’s dilemma and public goods settings. Indeed, our experiments show that recent models — with or without reasoning enabled — consistently defect in single-shot social dilemmas.